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Interdependencies between Leverage and Capital 
Ratios in the Banking Sector of the Czech Republic 
Karel Janda – Oleg Kravtsov 
1 Introduction  
It is widely believed that one of the causes of the latest financial crisis was the excessive 
build-up of the on and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. In some cases, the 
banks accumulated excessive leverage while evidently maintaining strong risk-based capital 
ratios BCBS (2014a). To address this issue and enhance the banks’ resilience to crisis, the 
Basel Committee in 2010 introduced a minimum leverage ratio as an additional prudential 
tool to complement minimum capital adequacy requirements.  The leverage ratio is defined as 
a Tier 1 capital divided by on and off-balance sheet exposure. The leverage ratio should be 
disclosed in the public reports of financial institutions from 1st of January 2015 onwards and 
fully implemented at the start of 2018 after appropriate review and calibration.  
In our paper we discuss the implications of leverage and capital requirements for the banking 
sector in the Czech Republic. We identify the potential binding constraints from regulatory 
limits and analyze the interactions among ratios over the country’s economic cycle (during the 
period 2007-2014). The following questions are of primary focus of our analysis. Which 
regulatory ratio in the Basel III regime (i.e. Tier 1 capital ratio, capital adequacy or leverage 
ratio) represents a main binding constraint in the country’s banking sector during the crisis 
and recovery periods (over the years 2007 to 2014)? What degree of correlation exists 
between leverage and capital ratio, and their variables over the economic cycle (2007-2014)? 
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What leverage and capital ratios can say about the behavior and strategy of the banks in the 
Czech Republic?  
In the debate about financial market regulations and their impact on the economies Musílek 
(2011), Teplý, Šobotníková and Černohorský (2011) in their works are dealing with the 
challenges of the Basel III guidelines for the EU and Czech banking sector. The banking 
regulations and systematic risk in financial market systems are investigated by Klinger and 
Teplý (2016) with special focus on the capital regulations in studies of Avery and Berger 
(1991), Gropp and Heider (2009), Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000). Notably few studies are 
focusing on the implications caused by interactions among regulatory ratios for example 
between capital and leverage ratios as risk and non-risk based measures.  In the analysis by 
Adrian and Shin (2008;2010), Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yesiltas (2011), Brei and 
Gambacorta (2014), the cyclical properties of the ratios are tested taking into account 
structural shifts in banks’ behavior during the global financial crisis and its aftermath. They 
suggest that in normal times the new leverage ratio based on the exposure measure is always 
more countercyclical than the other ratios. In contrast to capital ratios, it is a tighter constraint 
for banks in economy upturn and a looser constraint in recession. Nuno and Thomas (2013) 
argue that bank's leverage is endogenously determined by market forces. They found that 
leverage contributes at least as much as equity to the cyclical movements in total assets and 
leverage is negatively correlated with equity. Apparently it is positively correlated with assets 
growth and to a lesser extent with GDP. The impact of capital on bank survival during 
financial crises and normal times is examined by Berger and Bouwman (2013). Mainly 
focusing on the economic roles of capital depending on bank size and time period they 
indicate that the capital helps to enhance the survival probabilities of small banks at all times 
and for medium/large banks primarily during the banking crises and with limited government 
support. They note similarly that the off-balance sheet activities of banks are impacting the 
capital and consequently survivability of banks over the crisis. 
The effectiveness of the Basel Accords as a regulatory framework and its implications on the 
Czech banking sector were investigated by Šútorová and Teplý (2013; 2014) or Teplý and 
Vejdovec (2012). In country specific case study, Kellermann and Schlag (2013) examine the 
binding constraint factors of ratios on the Swiss banking sector. From their analysis it is 
evident that the minimum leverage ratio shows a strong tendency to undermine the risk-based 
requirements. Since at least during the period 2009 to 2011 the minimum leverage ratio 
requirement became a binding rule for the major Swiss bank UBS. Furthermore, they pointed 
3 
 
out that this fact might adversely encourage banks to take greater risks. Cathcart, El-Jahel and 
Jabbour (2013) investigate the interdependencies and pro-cyclical nature of capital and 
leverage ratios of the US banking institutions prior to the first 1990-1991 and the second 
credit crunch of 2007-2009.  Their results demonstrate that unlike during the first credit 
crunch, the leverage ratio during the crisis of 2007-2009 was a binding constraint and 
generally more to blame for triggering the subprime crisis. Furthermore, they argue that the 
reversal in correlation patterns between the two ratios was a main reason of the change in 
binding constraint. The correlation patterns of the ratios are seemingly related to loan growth 
and GDP market signals. 
 
2 Leverage Ratio under the Basel III  
The Basel III leverage ratio (LR) is defined as the capital measure (the numerator) divided by 
the exposure measure (the denominator), with this ratio expressed as a percentage 
 
t
t
Exp
K
LR              (1) 
Where  tK  - denotes a Tier 1 capital and tExp  - the exposure measure, at the end of reporting 
period t 
 
The capital measure represents the numerator of the leverage ratio and is based on the new 
definition of Tier 1 class of capital as set out by Basel Committee BCBS (2011). Under Basel 
III, the Tier 1 capital includes: the common equity Tier 1 (CET1) and the additional Tier 1. 
CET1 refers to loss-absorbing equity capital of the highest quality and consists of paid-in 
capital, disclosed reserves and retained earnings. The exposure represents the denominator of 
the leverage ratio. The exposure measure in definition of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision BCBS (2014a,b) is the sum of the following exposures: on-balance sheet 
exposures; derivative exposures; securities financing transaction exposures and off-balance 
sheet items. During the transition period from January 1, 2013 to January 1, 2017, Basel 
Committee will test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio > 3 %. The disclosure requirements of 
the ratio and its components at the bank level started on January 1, 2015. 
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3 Data  
The data sample comprises of data of the main banking institutions and subsidiaries of 
international banks which operate in the Czech Republic on standalone basis and provide a 
standard range of banking services, i.e. units in the sample are comparable. It consists of 15 
main Czech banks and covers the period of 8 years from 2007 to 2014 that refers to the full 
economic cycle with financial crisis, aftermath and recovery.  The financial data has been 
extracted directly from the annual reports of the financial institutions to provide the best 
possible estimates of banks’ exposure measures for the leverage ratio calculation according to 
the Basel III definition. In the data sample, two small size banks did not report all data over 
the period, since they were established at later period (e.g. Airbank established in 2010). 
Tab. 1:  Statistics Summary 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev  Min  Max 
Leverage Ratio (%) 111 8.3 6.2 1.9 43.6 
Capital Ratio Tier 1 (%) 110 18.6 22.6 7.4 211.6 
Exposure  (CZKm) 113 279,041 360,007 331 1,167,064 
Tier 1 capital (CZKm) 112 17,814 20,713 80 76,164 
Risk Weighted Assets 
(CZKm) 
110 133,386 151,282 284.2 503,360 
Total Assets (CZKm) 115 245,222 323,855 331 968,723 
Source: Annual financial reports (own calculation) 
 
4 Binding Constrains from Capital and Leverage Ratios over the Cycle 
By introducing a leverage ratio the Basel Committee pursued several goals. The minimum 
leverage provides a simple and transparent accounting measure that serves as a non-risk based 
„backstop“ which ultimately serves to protect against model risk, and the reduction of capital 
requirements and generally it reinforces risk based requirements BCBS (2014a). It captures 
both the on-and off balance sheet exposure which in fact could bear significant risks due to 
the complex and not fully transparent derivative and guarantees exposures. Finally the 
primary goal of leverage is to constraint a build-up of excessive leverage in banking system 
during the times of credit boom and help to soften the deleveraging processes in downturn 
economy cycle.  These cyclical qualities of the leverage and capital ratios have been indicated 
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in several studies. The evidences by Adrian and Shin (2008;2010), Nuno and Thomas (2013) 
are based on the empirical analysis of the US financial intermediaries that operate primarily 
through the highly liquid and dynamic capital markets. They suggest that these financial 
institutions are adjusting their balance sheets actively in such way that leverage tends to be 
higher during the economy booms and lower during the slowdown and recession.  In normal 
times however, leverage is less cyclical. The capital ratios reveal opposite counter-cyclical 
qualities and seem to be more stable and less procyclical in the crisis times Brei and 
Gambacorta (2014), Kellermann and Schlag (2013). According to this logic, both leverage 
and capital measures might represent a binding constraint for the banks in various economy 
cycles. Depending on which one of the two ratios is the stricter binding constraint, the 
incentive for the bank strategies might have different approach according to Blundell-Wignall 
and Atkinson (2010), Cathcart, El-Jahel and Jabbour (2013). It implies that the management 
of bank capital and leverage ratios over the course of the business cycle might be as important 
as the risk-based capital requirements particularly by determining the cyclical impact of 
capital regulation. 
In the Figure 1 and Table 1, we summarize the historical evolution and potential regulatory 
constraints on the capital and leverage ratios for the largest Czech banks over the economic 
cycles. The period 2007-2009 refers to crisis period and years of 2010-2014 as a recovery and 
normal times. The following ratios are evaluated: (a) the new Basel III leverage ratio (as Tier 
1 / Exposure measure); (b) the accounting leverage ratio (Tier 1/ Total assets); (c) the capital-
to-risk-weighted-assets ratio (Tier 1/ Risk-weighted assets); (d) the capital adequacy (Total 
capital / Risk weighted assets). The first three ratios (a), (b), (c) have different denominators 
but relate to each other with the same numerator - Tier 1 capital. We have included into our 
review an accounting leverage (b) which has total assets on balance sheet in denominator 
instead of exposure. This helps us to separate the impact of off- balance sheet exposures, 
derivatives and guarantees on the Basel III leverage ratio and additionally to judge the risks 
stemming from off balance transactions that we are discussing later in the paper.  The capital 
ratio (d) has been added to estimate the development of the banks' capital adequacy over the 
period. The regulatory guidelines on minimum requirements under the Basel III regime are 
the following: minimum leverage requirement ≥ 3.0% during the testing period from 1st 
January 2013 to 1st January 2017 with disclosure requirement starting from 1st January 2015 
BCBS (2014a,b) and BCBS (2011); minimum requirement for Tier 1 capital (incl. Tier 1 
additional capital) ≥ 6.0% of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) with minimum Tier 1 capital ratio 
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in Basel III phase-in arrangements in 2013 ≥ 4.5% , in 2014 ≥ 5.5% and starting from 2015 ≥ 
6.0%; minimum total capital requirement (sum of total Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital) ≥ 8.0% of 
RWA. 
The weighted median of all risk and non-risk based ratios reveal an upward trend during the 
various economic cycles, newly analyzed by Stadnik and Miecinskiene (2015). Between the 
crisis period of 2007-09 and recovery years 2010-14, the median of the risk-weighted Tier 1 
capital ratio increased from 11.3% to 14.9%, while the leverage ratio in the Basel III regime 
increased very moderately from 5.6% to 6.8%. The total capital ratio (capital adequacy) 
increased even at larger extent from 12.3% to 15.8%. Teplý, Šobotníková and Černohorský 
(2011), Matejašák (2015) similarly noted that Basel III requirements on capital are not 
presenting a larger constraint because of the historically high capital ratios of the Czech 
banks. The data show that contrary to the capital ratios, the leverage of the Czech banks might 
represent potentially larger constraint in terms of meeting the transitional minimum regulatory 
limits. We observe that only in 5% of cases from total sample the leverage of few banks has 
happened to be lower than the regulatory guidelines at some point of time. The mean of the 
leverage ratio across the sample is around 8.3% that is overall higher than leverage level 
referred as a minimum requirements ≥ 3.0%.  
Fig. 1:  Average leverage and capital ratios in crisis (2007-09)  and recovery period 
(2010-14) 
 
Leverage ratio
(Tier1/Exp)
Leverage ratio
(Tier1/TA)
Tier 1 capital ratio
(Tier1/RWA)
Capital ratio
(T1+T2/RWA)
2007-09
2010-14
Min Req
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Source: annual reports and own calculation (note: all ratios are weighted average by 
respective denominator i.e. RWA, exposure or total assets)  
Tab. 2:  Capital and leverage ratios for the banks in the Czech Republic (2007-2014) 
Ratios 
(a)  
Leverage  
(Tier 1 / 
Exposure) 
(b)  
Leverage  
(Tier 1 / Total 
assets ) 
(c) 
Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio 
( Tier 1 / RWA ) 
(d)  
Capital 
Adequacy  
( Tier 1+ Tier 2  
/ RWA) 
  median <3.0% median <3.0% median <6.0% median <8.0% 
Top 5 largest 
banks 
6.3%   7.0%   12.7%   13.7%   
All banks 8.3%   10.7%   18.6%   19.3%   
As a % from total 
observations 
  4.5%   2.7%   0.0%   0.0% 
Source: annual reports and own calculation (note: all ratios are mean weighted by respective 
denominator i.e. RWA, Exp or TA)  
 
In order to assess the strategies of banking sector towards adjustments in capital and leverage 
ratios, we take a closer look into interdependencies between the components of the leverage 
ratio and the Tier 1 capital ratio. Since both of them have the same numerator (Tier 1 Capital), 
it allows us to relate and analyze changes in their denominators - risk weighted assets versus 
exposure or total assets Berger and Bouwman (2013), Cathcart, El-Jahel and Jabbour (2013). 
We rearrange the relation of Tier 1 capital ratio to leverage ratios (both ratios with exposure 
based and accounting measure of total assets) as follows: 
t
t
t
t
t
t
Exp
RWA
RWA
K
Exp
K
CR
LR
          (2) 
 
where  tK  - denotes a Tier 1 capital, tRWA  stands for risk-weighted assets and tExp  - the 
exposure measure (or total assets on the balance sheet), at the end of reporting period t. 
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The relationship of risk weighted assets to exposure (or total assets) captures also the riskiness 
of the business model of the banks. The higher ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets 
suggests that the portfolio contains more risky assets. For example the sovereign bonds 
portfolio has usually the lowest risk, depending significantly on the level of interest rates – 
Stadnik (2014), weight up to 0.0% (in standardized approach of credit risk measurements 
under the Basel II capital adequacy guidelines), since this asset class is considered to be the 
safest and on opposite, traded securitization products have the highest up to 1250% risk 
weight. 
In the Figure 2, we exhibit the historical evolution of risk weights over the period of 2007-
2014 of the largest Czech banks. The notable trend is that both risk weights tend to decline 
steadily during the entire period. Apparently the Czech banks are focusing more on the 
optimization of risk weighted assets and structuring portfolios with lower risk weights. The 
banks by adjusting their business model are changing their activities and asset structure, so 
their income might be impacted too. For the banks with a higher leverage level, it could lead 
to reduction in lending volumes and hence poses risks for the income growth and profitability.  
As a result of inclusion into the Basel III leverage exposure the off balance sheet items with 
100% credit conversion factor, the trade finance transactions and hedging activities of the 
Czech banks will be affected by higher capital requirements noted by Teplý, Šobotníková and 
Černohorský (2011). 
Fig. 2:  Historical evolution of risk weights to exposure and total assets (2007-2014) 
 
Source: annual reports and own calculation   
Other remarkable observation from the Figure 2 is that the off balance sheet exposure, which 
is mostly stemming from complex derivative transactions and other guarantees has a stable 
proportion to total assets over the 8 year horizon. This fact suggests that the banks in the 
30%
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45%
50%
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65%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
RWA / Exposure RWA / Total Assets
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sample are not shifting significant risks off balance sheets in times of economic distress. The 
off balance-sheet items of the Czech banks constitute a relative small fraction to total assets 
on average (10%). In comparison, the data across the top EU and US banks (over the period 
of 2000-2009) presented by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yesiltas (2011) shows that the 
maximum amount of the off-balance sheet items was 65% of assets with a mean of 10%.  
Fig. 3:  Annual growth in total assets versus annual change in leverage for the top 10 
Czech banks 2007-2014 
 
Source: annual reports and own calculations   
The potential cyclical qualities of the leverage we observe by plotting the changes of mean 
leverage against the annual growth of total assets for the sample of the 10 largest Czech banks 
(Figure 3). The annual changes in the balance sheets over the observed period seemingly 
follow the economic cycle with “reverse” movement of leverage versus assets characteristic 
for the crisis years 2008-2009. In overall, the adjustments in the leverage (co-movement with 
total assets) reveal similar pattern described by Brei and Gambacorta (2014), Adrian and Shin 
(2010). As explained by these authors, such a strong co-movement signifies an active 
management of leverage as a means of expanding and contracting the size of balance sheets. 
They suggest that the largest banks might be able to use the increased equity as basis for 
further lending which will increase assets (and liabilities) relative to equity with the outcome 
that asset and leverage is no longer inversely related. In other words, the banks are attempting 
to maximize the capital utility and by doing so they increase their assets respectively. The 
potential risk is that this way the banks could be incentivized to increase their risk appetite. 
Given the actual level of capital and confronted with the choice between low risk and low 
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margin, and higher risk but higher margin most banks will likely opt for the second option 
according to European Banking Authority Report (2015) 
 
5 Analysis of Correlation Patterns  
In this section of the paper, we investigate the correlation patterns between banks leverage 
and capital ratios over the economic cycle 2007-2014 in the Czech Republic.  Building on the 
study and using similar methodological approach of Cathcart, El-Jahel and Jabbour (2013), 
Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000), Nuño and Thomas (2013), we try to capture any patterns 
of co-movements of both ratios and interdependencies among their variables. 
 
For the purpose of analysis, we use the Pearson correlation measure between leverage and 
capital ratio. The results depicted on the Figure 4 demonstrate that a high degree of positive 
correlation indeed exists between both ratios (with a range of coefficient from 0.6 to 0.9). The 
possible explanation for that lies in the components of the ratios and mostly attributable to the 
offsetting effect of increase in capital (Tier 1 capital is a numerator of both ratios) combined 
with the adjustments in the assets (described in previous section). The time horizon of our 
analysis covers the period of constantly increasing capitalization of the Czech banks driven by 
stricter regulatory requirements and business model. The findings by Teplý, Šobotníková and 
Černohorský (2011), Matejašák (2015) similarly confirm that capital basis of the Czech banks 
increased substantially over the period 2009-2013 and consequently improving on average 
regulatory capital ratios.  
 
The interactions between macroeconomic conditions, bank regulations and governmental 
policies are relevant for all advanced economies and especially for newly EU integrated 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe (Cevik, Dibooglu and Kutan (2016), Janda (2011) 
and Janda, Michalikova and Skuhrovec (2013)). In particular, by introducing the leverage in 
the Basel III framework, the Basel Committee aimed exactly at reinforcing the capital 
requirements with non-risk measures and this way to mitigate the magnifying effect of the 
economic cycles. The interesting question is how the business cycles in the Czech Republic 
affect the interactions of both ratios. To exhibit the effect of business cycles we plot the 
correlation patterns altogether with the economic cycles’ indicators such as loan volumes 
growth and GDP. The loan volume growth in the economy is represented by the "Loans to 
private sector - Annual growth rates" from the official statistics of the CNB. The annual 
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changes in gross domestic product relate to economy conditions and cycles Jakubik and 
Fungacova (2013), Izák (2011). To capture a lagged effect of macroeconomic factors on the 
microeconomic level of banking sector, we use a half year delayed GDP figures, i.e. a 
comparison of 2nd Quarter GDP annual change versus year end values of both ratios. 
 
The results in the Figure 4 underline the fact that leverage and capital ratios have a tendency 
to co-movement in normal times and a slightly counter- movement in the time of downturn or 
upswing. Though, it does not reveal at all the negative correlation between leverage versus 
capital ratio in crisis period, which was described by Cathcart, El-Jahel and Jabbour (2013). It 
implies that the change in the binding constraint from one to another ratio does not explicitly 
occur during the period of our observation.  
Fig. 4:  Correlation pattern changes in leverage/capital ratio versus loan volume and 
GDP growth during 2007-2014 
 
Source: Czech National Bank, annual reports and own calculations   
At the beginning of this section we have been focusing on the correlation patterns between 
two ratios. In order to understand the contribution of the single factors to the fluctuations in 
the leverage ratio now we analyze and compare the cyclical qualities of the variables that we 
discussed earlier. We extract the cyclical components of the variables by applying the cycle 
band-pass filter for economic time series of Baxter and King (1999). Based on the statistics of 
previous US business cycles, they developed a set of approximate filters to measure the 
business cycles of macroeconomic activity. The procedure enables to isolate business cycle 
component transforming the macroeconomic data by applying the particular moving averages. 
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The filter allows extracting a cyclical component which persists for the periods of two to eight 
years, and leaves the characteristics of this component undistorted. The cyclical (de-trended) 
components of the variables were used to compare the volatility of the variables and plot their 
correlation patterns.  
First of all, we try to assess the contribution of the total assets and Tier 1 capital to the 
cyclical fluctuations in the leverage ratio. Secondly, it is of interest for us to estimate how 
leverage and capital correlate with each other, and how each component correlates with total 
assets. A related question is how the leverage ratio and the assets of banks correlate with 
aggregate economic activity, as represented by annual GDP in constant prices and loan to 
private sector volumes from the official statistics of the CNB. Furthermore, the certain degree 
of volatility in leverage, assets and Tier 1 capital relative to those in real economic activity is 
itself a matter of empirical interest. The aggregated results are exhibited in the Table 3 and 
can be summarized in the following points. The leverage in the sample is less volatile than 
assets and equity capital, but it fluctuates stronger than economic indicators GDP and loan 
volumes growth. The standard deviation of leverage is more than twice of the capital and total 
assets. The higher volatility in a variable might suggest a larger possible error in evaluating 
the cyclical co-movement patterns with other variables. The total assets and exposure, in 
contrast to Tier 1 capital show the largest contribution to the cyclical movement of the 
leverage. The strong negative correlation with leverage (coefficient -0.540) reiterates the 
observations by Adrian and Shin (2010), Brei and Gambacorta (2014) and points out that the 
leverage ratio represents a tighter constraint in the upturn cycle by expanding balance sheet 
and a looser one in the recession period when assets are shrinking. 
Tab. 3:  Business cycles and leverage components  
Standard 
Deviations     Correlations 
  
    
  Std.Dev       Coefficient P-values   
Leverage 0.5066    
Leverage - Total 
Assets -0.540** 
(0.000) 
  
Tier 1 0.9559    Leverage - Exposure -0.552** (0.000)   
TA  1.1831    
Leverage - Capital Tier 
1 
-0.122 (0.200) 
  
Exp 1.1511    Leverage - GDP  0.056 (0.556)   
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GDP 0.0038    
Leverage - Loan 
Volumes 
-0.271 (0.004) 
  
Loan  0.0102        
 
    
      Assets - Loan Volumes 0.645** (0.000)   
      Assets - GDP  0.084 (0.382)   
 
NOTE:   
The sample period is 2007-2014. All variables are natural logarithms.  
For excel based add-in of the Baxter-King band-pass filter, we employ the standard 
settings Burns-Mitchell for annual data, i.e. min  2 and max 8 years, k=3 lowpass filter.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance of non-zero correlation at the 5% (**) 
confidence level.  
Significance 2 tailed tests are reported in parenthesis. 
  
  
  
  
    
 
          
Source: own calculation, data from CNB, annual reports  
Moreover our findings suggest that the capital Tier 1 indicates a weak correlation with 
negative vector to the leverage ratio. That fact contradicts to the mathematical logic of ratio 
that implies a positive correlation. The explanation is that the data in our sample covers the 
period when the capital increase was accompanied mostly by growth in assets. A larger data 
sample or a comparison with other countries banking sectors would be useful to investigate 
further on this issue. The leverage and total assets as well show a strong positive correlation 
(coefficient 0.645) with economic cycle indicator “loans to private sector” that is quiet self-
explanatory. However we observe weak correlation of leverage and total assets with GDP 
(coefficients 0.056 and 0.084 respectively). The degree of correlation is low possibly due to 
the delayed macro effect on the banking sector, however the positive vector points out the co-
movement tendencies.  
 
6 Conclusion  
In this concluding section we summarize the main results of our analysis of the impact of the 
leverage Basel III requirements on the Czech banking sector. For our empirical study, we 
used a data sample of 15 major banks operating in the Czech Republic over the period 2007-
2014. The historical data confirm stronger capital ratios of the banks and an overall solid 
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leverage level with only 5% of the total historical observations being lower than the 
regulatory recommendations.  
By analyzing the components of ratios, we were able to learn more about the strategies of the 
Czech banks. We conclude that evidently the banks are focusing more on the optimization of 
risk weighted assets and structuring portfolios with lower risks. Strong co-movement patterns 
between leverage and assets also suggest the active management of leverage in terms of 
expanding and contracting the size of balance sheets and maximizing the utility of the capital. 
We found out that the banks in the sample are not shifting significant risks off balance sheet. 
The off balance-sheet items constitute a relatively small fraction of assets (mean of 10%) and 
are comparable to the average of the top EU and US banks. 
The correlation patterns between leverage and capital ratios reveal mild pro-cyclical qualities. 
The economic cycle indicators such as a loan volume growth and GDP changes point to the 
countercyclical movements of the leverage versus capital ratio during the downward cycle in 
2007-2008. The analysis of correlation patterns among the variables indicates that the total 
assets (and exposure) in contrast to Tier 1 capital are indeed the main contributors to the 
cyclical movements in the leverage. The leverage and the total assets also demonstrate a weak 
correlation with GDP, but a strong co-movement with loan volumes to the private sector.  
The introduction of the Basel III regulations on leverage is another incentive for the Czech 
banks to strengthen more their capital position and reduce indebtedness. It is a major 
improvement over Basel II treatment of indebtedness and credit risk (Witzany 2010). On the 
other hand, it has certain implications. For the banks with a higher leverage level, it could lead 
to reduction in lending volumes and hence poses risks for the income growth and profitability. 
The risk appetite of the banks might increase, since the banks may be forced to choose how to 
optimize their capital usage. Furthermore, the banks might adjust their business model and 
change their activities and asset structure, so their income might be affected too (e.g. trade 
finance transactions and hedging activities of the Czech banks) 
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Interdependencies between Leverage and Capital Ratios in the Banking Sector of the Czech 
Republic 
Summary 
 
In this paper we discuss the implications of the Basel III requirements on the leverage ratio 
for the banking sector in the Czech Republic. We identify the potential binding constraints 
from regulatory limits and analyze the interactions among leverage and capital ratios over the 
country’s economic cycle (during the period 2007-2014).  
The historical data confirm stronger capital ratios of the banks and an overall solid leverage 
level with only 5% of the total historical observations being lower than the regulatory 
recommendations. By analyzing the components of ratios, we conclude that the banks are 
focusing more on the optimization of risk weighted assets. Strong co-movement patterns 
between leverage and assets point to the active management of leverage as a means of 
expanding and contracting the size of balance sheets and maximizing the utility of the capital.  
The analysis of correlation patterns among the variables indicates that the total assets (and 
exposure) in contrast to Tier 1 capital are the main contributors to the cyclical movements in 
the leverage. The leverage and the total assets also demonstrate a weak correlation with GDP, 
but a strong co-movement with loans to the private sector.  
Key words: Leverage ratio, capital ratio, Basel III, Czech Republic 
JEL classification: G30 
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